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Dynamic efficiency is a central issue in analyses of economic growth, the
effects of fiscal policies, and the pricing of capital assets. In a celebrated
article, Peter Diamond (1965) shows that a competitive economy can reach a
steady state in which there is unambiguously too much capital. In situations
where the population growth rate exceeds the steady state marginal product of
capital, or equivalently the economy is consistently investing more than it is
earning in profit, the economy is said to be dynamically inefficient. In the
terminology of Phelps (1961), the capital stock exceeds its Golden Rule leveL
A Pareto improvement can be achieved in a dynamically inefficient economy by
allowing the current generation to devour a portion of the capital stock and
then holding constant the consumption of all future generations.
Recent work suggests that dynamic efficiency is crucial for issues of
positive as well as normative economic analysis. Weil (1986) argues that
dynamic efficiency is a necessary condition for an altruistic bequest motive
to be operative and thus for the Ricardian equivalence theorem of Barro
(1974) to hold. Tirole (1985) shows that speculative bubbles can arise as
rational expectations equilibria of dynamically inefficient economies, but are
ruled out if dynamic efficiency prevails.
Whether actual economies operate above or below the Golden Rule level of
capital intensity is a question of substantial importance. Many authors take
the position that the United States economy is dynamically efficient. Such a
presumption must underlie optimal growth arguments for increased national
savings, such as those presented by Tobin (1965), Solow (1970), and Feldstein
(1977). These authors base their judgment that the economy is dynamically
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efficient on estimates of the marginal productivity of capital derived from
observed accounting profit rates. Such calculations (e.g., Feldstein and
Summers (1977)) suggest that the marginal productivity of capital is about 10
percent, far above the economy's growth rate, and thus indicate the economy is
dynamically efficient.
Yet there is an alternative, and on its face equally plausible, procedure
for judging whether an economy is dynamically efficient -- looking at the safe
real interest rate, such as the return on Treasury bills. Unlike the
accounting profit rate, the short-term real interest rate can be measured with
little ambiguity, and contains at most a negligible risk premium. Feldstein
(1976), in arguing against the Ricardian equivalence proposition, explicitly
conipares the economy's growth rate and real interest rate. Numerous other
authors in a variety of contexts also note that real interest rates on safe
assets are typically less than economic growth rates. Ibbotson (1984) reports
that the mean real return on Treasury bills over the 1926-1983 period was
roughly zero percent, well under the economy's average growth rate. Data on
other nations, such as those presented by Mishkin (1984), suggest that
interest rates are less than growth rates in other countries as well. This
comparison of real interest rates and growth rates seems to suggest that
mature capitalist economies have overaccumulated capital.
In abstract growth models like Diamond's, there is no difference between
the marginal product of capital, which might be inferred from data on profits
and the capital stock, and the real interest rate on safe government
securities. Nor are there fluctuations in the economy's growth rate or in the
relative value of capital goods. Such models therefore give little guidance
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as to which features of actual economies should be examined in assessing
dynamic efficiency. To address this issue, it is necessary to examine models
in which profitability, the value of capital, and the growth rate are
uncertain, so that the distinction between the marginal productivity of
capital and the interest rate on safe government securities is a meaningful
one. This paper examines the conditions for dynamic efficiency in such
models. Our goal is to ascertain what observable features of actual economies
can be used to make inferences about dynamic efficiency and then to assess
whether the United States economy is dynamically efficient.
We begin by generalizing the original Golden Rule result of Phelps (1961)
and others: an economy is dynamically efficient if it invests less than the
return to capital and is inefficient if it invests more than the return to
capital. This result applies to a stochastic setting with a very general
production technology. In a competitive economy, therefore, the issue of
dynamic efficiency can be resolved by comparing the level of investment with
the cash flows generated by production after the payment of wages. More
metaphorically, the key question is whether the capital sector is on net a
spout or a sink. This criterion has the substantial virtue of not requiring
any information on capital gains and losses, and not requiring the use of
accounting conventions in the measurement of profit. Its application to the
United States economy suggests very clearly that it is dynamically efficient.
The economy has always (since 1929 at least) consumed a substantial portion of
the return to capital. Similar results obtain for other developed capitalist
economies as well.
While we argue that the net cash flow criterion is the most natural and
general way to think about the issue of dynamic efficiency, much of the
discussion of the issue centers on comparisons of rates of return and growth
rates. We therefore present results characterizing the circumstances under
which a comparison of growth rates and rates of return can determine whether
an economy is dynamically efficient. Our conclusion is that the appropriate
criterion involves evaluations of whether asset returns dominate the growth in
wealth valued in terms of consumption goods. That is, dynamic efficiency
cannot be assessed by comparing the safe rate of interest and the average
growth rate of the capital stock, output, or any other accounting aggregate.
Rather, the safe rate must be compared with the rate of growth of the market
value of the capital stock. In actual economies, where the market value of
existing capital goods fluctuates widely and declines frequently, this
comparison is unlikely to render any verdict about dynamic efficiency.
While these results suggest we are safe in concluding that economies like
that of the United States are dynamically efficient, some troubling questions
remain. Why, if physical assets that always yield a positive return are
available, is the safe rate of interest so low? If the safe rate of interest
is zero or negative, why don't infinitely-lived productive assets have an
infinite value? If the safe rate of interest is below the economy's growth
rate, can't a pay-as-you--go social security system be Pareto-improving? To
address these questions, we present a simple example highlighting the
potential importance of capital price risk in determining asset values. We
show that in a dynamically efficient economy where output evolves as a
geometric random walk with positive drift, the safe rate of interest over all
horizons may at all times be negative. This example makes clear that
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comparisons of the safe rate of interest and average growth rates are
misleading for the purpose of assessing dynamic efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops our cash flow
criterion for assessing the dynamic efficiency of an economy and applies it to
United States data. Section II considers rate of return criteria for dynamic
efficiency. Section III highlights the role of capital price risk in
accounting for the low observed level of safe interest rates. Section IV
concludes the paper by calling attention to a number of issues requiring
further research.
I. A General Criterion for Dynamic Efficiency
Here we examine a generalization of the economy studied by Diamond
(1965). There are two crucial differences between Diamondts
overlapping
generations model and ours. First, we allow both the rate of population
growth and the production technology to be stochastic. Second, our production
technology is very general; it allows, as special cases, for costs of
adjustment, time-to-build, vintage capital, and embodied and disembodied
technological progress. Unlike the technology typically assumed in one-sector
growth models, our general production technology allows for fluctuations in
the relative price of claims on existing capital goods and consumption. This
feature of the model is important, because much of the risk associated with
holding capital in actual economies involves uncertainty about capital gains
and losses arising from changes in the relative price of capital.
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A. The Economy
Each individual lives for two periods and maximizes a
von Neumann—Morgenstern utility function that, for simplicity, is additively
separable over consumption -in the two periods. Thus, individuals maximize
(1.1) u(c) + Ev(c+1)
where c is the consumption of a young person in period t, c1 is the
consumption of an old person in period t+1, and Et is the expectation
conditional on information available at time t.
There are Nt individuals in the cohort born at time t. The young supply
their labor inelastically, and the old do not work, so Nt is also the labor
supply in period t. Each young person consumes some of the return to his
labor and invests the rest by buying shares in the new and existing firms that
compose the market portfolio. In old age, he receives dividends from his
shares, sells them ex dividend to the young cohort, and consumes the total
proceeds.
An individual therefore faces the following budget constraint:
(1.2) c = w — Vs
(1.3) c1 = + v1)s
where w. -is the wage, iS his share of the market portfolio, Vt is the total
value of the market portfolio ex dividend, and is the total dividend.
Letting Rt+i denote the return on any asset between period t and period t+1,
then the standard first—order condition for capital asset pricing is
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I 0v (c ) R
(1.4) E[ =u' (c)
Equation (1.4) of course holds also for the return on the market portfoUo,
for which = R1 (Vt+i+Dti)/v.
A few identities are instructive. Aggregate consumption C is
(1.5) Ct Ntc + Ntic.
and the aggregate share is Ntst = 1. Equations (1.2) and (1.3) therefore
imply that consumption is labor income plus the dividend:
(1.6) Ct wtNt + Dt.
Let be gross output, — wN be profit, and - C be
investment. Equation (1.6) implies
(L7) D E —
The dividend as we define it equals profit less investment. (Equivalently,
the dividend equals consumption less labor income.) Note that a repurchase of
shares by firms is represented here as a dividend payment. Similarly, a new
equity issue is a negative dividend. The dividend thus represents the net
flow of goods from firms to households (except of course for labor income),
and there is no presumption regarding its sign.1
Firms produce output from capital and labor. We assume that the
production technology is:
(1.8) = F(It_l,It_2,...It_n;Nt,øt)
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where is the gross investment in period t, and 8, is the state of nature
in period t. Note that the technology expressed in equation (1.8) is very
general. Under the common assumption that capital fully depreciates each
period, each period's investment equals next period's capital stock, so
= F(It_i;Nt,Ot). A dependence of output on past investment, however,
arises if there are costs of adjustment of capital. It also arises if, as is
plausible, capital does not fully depreciate each period and the type of
capital built each period varies because of changes in the available
technology.
We assume that the technology has constant returns to scale. That is,
F(.) is homogeneous of degree one in past investment and current labor supply.
The competitive wage is therefore
(1.9) wtF(Iti,It.2s...It_n;NtOt)/t
The total return to capital is
(1.10) = FIt_
where indicates the partial derivative of F(.) with respect to vintage t-i
investment. We assume that 0. The specification in (1.8) implies
that E 0 for i > n. Equation (1.10) says that profits are composed of
return to capital of all vintages.
An equilibrium of this economy is a set of state-contingent allocations
and market prices that satisfies all the individual and economywide
constraints and that also satisfies the first-order condition (1.4). We are
interested in characterizing the conditions under which such an equilibrium is
dynamically efficient or inefficient.
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B. Dynamic Efficiency
Let (°t) be the ex ante utility of generation t given that this
generation is born in state of nature 0• That is,
(1.11) (°t) = u(c'(e)) + E(v(c o.
We call an initial equilibrium namically inefficient if it is possible to
increase cl(05) for some G without decreasing (8t) for any other et; if such
a Pareto improvement is impossible, an equilibrium is yjcjl efficient.
Consider a social welfare function
(1.12) W = v(c) + Z 1(;t(Ut)
t=o
where g(Q) is the weight the social planner gives to
An equilibrium is dynamically efficient if it maximizes social welfare W
for some set of positive weights It is important to stress the nature
of the social welfare function in equation (1.12). In the unfettered
equilibrium, there are no private markets in which individuals can insure
against the state of nature in which they are born. Since our concern in this
paper is the issue of overaccumulation, and not intergenerational
risk—sharing, we do not call an equilibrium inefficient if the absence of
these insurance markets is the only market failure. Formally, we allow the
social planner to apply separate social planning weights to the same
individual born in different states of nature.
We now turn to the principal result of this paper:
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Proposition 1: If D/V, 0 in all periods and all states of nature, then
the equilibrium is dynamically efficient. If Dt/Vt -c < 0 in all periods
and all states of nature, then the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient.
This proposition states that if goods are on net always flowing out of firms
to investors, then the equilibrium is efficient. Conversely, if goods are on
net always flowing into firms from investors, then the equilibrium is
inefficient. Our proposition is a generalization of the Golden Rule result of
Phelps (1961): an economy that invests more than its total profit in steady
state is dynamically inefficient.
The familiar condition from the Diamond model for dynamic efficiency is
that the marginal product of capital (r) exceeds the growth rate of population
(n). Note that the growth rate of population equals the growth rate of the
capital stock in Diamond's steady state. Therefore, since rK is the total
return on the aggregate capital stock K and nK is new investment, the net flow
out of firms (the dividend) is rK - nK. Hence, while Proposition 1 is much
more general, it is consistent with the traditional criterion in the steady
state of Diamond model.
The proof of efficiency is in the Appendix. The proof of inefficiency
follows.
C. Proof of Inefficiency
Following Cass (1972), we provide a constructive proof of the
inefficiency condition by illustrating a Pareto-improving intervention that is
feasible if the inefficiency condition is satisfied. Suppose that in period 1
the consumption of each old consumer is increased by 6 and the consumption of
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the current young consumers and the consumptions of all future generations are
left unchanged. Clearly, such a change would be Pareto-improving. If such a
change is feasible, then the initial equilibrium was inefficient.
Since aggregate consumption in period 1 is increased by 5N0, the change
in aggregate investment, d11, is equal to -oN0. This reduction in I implies
that output will be reduced by FdI1 in period 2. Since consumption in period
2 -is to remain unchanged, investment must fall by the same amount as output
(1.13) d12 = FdI1.
In each subsequent period the reduction in output must be matched by a fall in
investment of the same magnitude, so that, differentiating the production
function, we obtain
n
(1.14) dlt = z
1=1
Now define E dlt/It to be the proportional change in period t investment.
Using this definition and dividing both sides of (1.14) by I, yields a
homogeneous linear difference equation in
(1.15) = E(FIt./It)t.
If the proportional change in investment is always finite and approaches
zero as t goes to infinity, then, for an appropriately small 0, the
intervention is feasible. Therefore, if the coefficients FIt /Iti i = 1,
• . ,n, in the difference equation (1.16) are always positive and sum to less
than one, then the intervention is feasible.
It remains to show that the condition D/V. -c < 0 implies that
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< 1. We suppose that D/V -c < 0 and use (1.7) and (1.10)
to obtain
(1.16) [(EFIt.) - I]/V -c < 0.
Observing that 0
It/Vt 1, equation (1.16) implies
(1.17) [(tFI.) I)/v cI/V < 0.
Equation (1.17) implies directly that
(1.18) ZFI./V (1_c)I/V.
Dividing both sides of (1.18) by yields
(1.19) 1 - c < 1,
which is the condition that coefficients in the linear difference equation
(1.15) sum to less than one. Therefore, if D/V -c < 0, then the proposed
Pareto-improving intervention is feasible.
Q.E.D.
0. Applying the Cash Flow Criterion
The criterion derived above for determining whether an economy is
dynamically efficient can be applied relatively easily to actual economies.
Unlike the criteria applied in many previous applications of optimal growth
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models (e.g., Solow (1970)), our criterion does not depend critically on
accounting judgments about depreciation or the measurement of profits in an
inflationary environment. It requires only the comparison of the cash flows
going into and coming out of an economy's production sector.2 As the
preceding discussion makes clear, the applicability of our criterion depends
on the assumption that capital receives its marginal product, an assumption
that excludes the possibility that capital income includes substantial
monopoly profit.
We apply our criterion to the United States economy and to the economies
of several other major countries. While the theory developed above is most
directly applicable to the economy as a whole, we examine the U.S.
nonfinancial corporate sector as well, for two reasons. First, many popular
discussions of the desirability of increased capital formation refer to
corporate investment rather than investment in housing. Second, in measuring
the rental income generated by owner—occupied housing, one must use estimates
of imputed rents, rather than direct measurements of market transactions.
Fortunately, the calculations for the economy as a whole and the calculations
for the corporate sector yield very similar results. Both suggest that our
criterion for dynamic efficiency has been satisfied by a wide margin in all
years.
Table I presents information on gross capital income, gross investment,
and their difference, all expressed as fractions of gross national product
(GNP) for the 1929-1985 period. Gross capital income is measured as national
income less employee compensation and an estimate of the labor income of
proprietors plus capital consumption allowances. Alternatively, it can be
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thought of as the sum of profit, rental, and interest income.3 Gross
'investment includes investment in both residential and nonresidential capital
along with increases in inventories. Their difference corresponds to the
"dividend," D, paid by firms. For the period 1952-1985, for which an estimate
of the market value of the economy's tangible assets is available, the table
also presents the ratio DIV. which plays a key role in the preceding analysis.
The data indicate very clearly that capital has consistently generated
more income than has been reinvested. Indeed, the difference between
capital income and investment has exceeded 15 percent of GNP in every year
•sirice 1929. Put differently, the economy has never invested much more than
half of its gross capital income. The final column of the table indicates
that the dividend generated by capital has consistently exceeded 4 percent of
total wealth. Given the downward trend in the ratio of the dividend to GNP
and the upward trend in the ratio of total wealth to GNP, it is fairly certain
that the dividend generated by capital exceeded 4 percent during the entire
1929—1985 period.
Table 2 presents calculations paralleling those in Table 1 for the
nonfinancial corporate sector. Outflow from the nonfinancial corporate sector
(D) is defined as the sum of dividends, interest payments, and corporate tax
payments, less net financial investments. Except for a statistical
discrepancy, this outflow in turn equals the difference between gross pretax
operating profits and gross capital investment. (Again, investment is
measured as including both purchases of plant and equipment and increases in
inventories.) In all calculations, the denominator is the market value of the
corporate sector measured as the sum of the market value of outstanding
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equity, and net financial liabilities as reported in the National Balance
Sheets. The results establish that for the 1952-1985 period gross capital
income far exceeded gross investment. Indeed, in most years, the disparity is
somewhat greater for the corporate sector than it is for the aggregate
economy. This finding is not surprising given the heavier tax burdens placed
on corporate capital. It appears clear from these calculations that the
corporate sector is on net productive, in the sense that net outflows of cash
from the corporate sector are positive.
Table 3 presents values of 0/GNP for England, France, Germany, Italy,
Canada and Japan for the 1960-1984 period. Examining the dynamic efficiency
of economies other than the U.S. economy is of interest because the American
savings rate has traditionally been much lower than that of other countries.
Japan in particular, with its high rate of accumulation and tradition of low
real interest rates, seems a plausible candidate for inefficiency. Yet the
data reveal that our criterion for dynamic efficiency is comfortably satisfied
for all countries in all years. Countries like Japan with higher investment
rates also have higher rates of profit. In 1984, for example, the U.S.
invested 16 percent of GNP and had gross capital cash flow of 28 percent of
GNP. For Japan, the corresponding figures were 28 percent and 38 percent.
The calculations in Tables 1—3 show that our criterion for dynamic
efficiency has been very decisively satisfied for the worldts major capitalist
economies. Yet as Phelps emphasized in his initial development of the Golden
Rule, a path cannot be judged as dynamically efficient or dynamically
inefficient prior to eternity. That is, dynamic efficiency cannot in
principle be judged by observing only a particular segment of time. These
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calculations do allow us to conclude, however, that if the economy behaves in
the future as it has -in the past, it will be realizing a dynamically efficient
equilibrium.
II. Using Rates of Return to Diagnose Overaccumulation
In Section I we presented sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency
and dynamic inefficiency expressed in terms of investment and profit. Much of
the literature on dynamic efficiency expresses the relevant conditions in
terms of rates of return and growth rates. In this section we examine how one
can compare rates of return and growth rates to assess dynamic efficiency.
Recall that the rate of return on the market portfolio, is equal to
(vt÷i+Dt41)/vt. Defining V1/V as the growth rate of the value of
the market portfolio we obtain
(2.1) RM /6 E + D /Vt+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
Equation (2.1) immediately implies the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1: If R/G 1 + c > 1 in all periods and all states of nature,
then the equilibrium is dynamically efficient. If R/Gt 1 — £ < 1 in
all periods and all states of nature, then the equilibrium is dynamically
inefficient.
Corollary I states that the rate of return on capital can be used in
assessing whether the economy is dynamically efficient. The condition for
efficiency in Corollary 1 will be satisfied if the dividend is always greater
—17-
than zero.
A more general result is also available for assessing dynamic efficiency.
The competitive rate of return on any other asset can also be potentially
useful in determining whether the economy is dynamically efficient or
inefficient. Let Rt+i be the competitive rate of return between period t and
period t+i on an arbitrary asset. In the Appendix we present an extension of
the proof of Proposition 1 that proves the following Proposition:
Proposition 2: If there is some asset with rate of return R such that
1 + 1 in all periods and all states of nature, then the
equilibrium is dynamically efficient. If there is some asset with rate of
return Rt such that 1 - I in all periods and all states of nature,
then the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient.
This result can be applied in the special case of the safe interest rate.
It says that if an economy's safe interest rate is always greater than the
growth rate of the market value of the capital stock, the economy is dynamically
efficient. If the safe rate is always less than the growth rate of the value of
the capital stock, the economy is dynamically inefficient. Neither
proposition is very helpful in judging the dynamic efficiency of actual
economies, where capital gains and losses cause the growth of the market value
of the capital stock sometimes to exceed and other times to fall short of the
safe interest rate. The result here is illuminating primarily in suggesting
that comparisons of safe interest rate with the average growth rate are in
general not sufficient to resolve the issue of dynamic efficiency.
-18-
III. Capital Price Risk and the Low Level of Safe Interest Rates
The previous section suggests that a safe interest rate below an
economy's average growth rate is not sufficient to establish dynamic
inefficiency. This conclusion may at first seem surprising. If all the
investments an economy is making are productive, how can the safe interest
rate be so low? More generally, how can the measured rate of profit suggest
that the marginal product of capital is so high at the same time that the real
interest rate is so low? These questions differ from the puzzle regarding the
equity risk premium raised by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Mehra and Prescott
ask why, given the wide spread between mean equity and debt returns and given
the limited variability of consumption, consumers do not try to borrow to buy
equity, thereby reducing the mean equity premium. Here the question is why
low interest rates can persist given the consistently high level of the
average product of capital. To pose the question starkly, can physical assets
that always yield a positive dividend have a finite value when real interest
rates are zero or negative?
A basic answer to these questions lies in the notion of capital price
risk. The principal risks associated with the ownership of capital do not
involve the rents it will generate in the succeeding period, but rather
involve the possibility of changes in its market value. Individuals
considering the ownership of capital take account of these risks. Even if an
asset will always be productive, individuals are exposed to the risk that its
price will decline if anticipated future profits fall off, or if the demand
for wealth declines. Such risks explain how a low safe rate can coincide
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permanently with a high rate of profit in a dynamically efficient economy.
We illustrate this point with a simple example based on Lucas's (1978)
analysis of asset pricing. In contrast to the preceding sections, we assume
here that there is a single representative infinitely lived consumer. Since
the competitive outcome in this case replicates the solution to the social
planning problem of maximizing the utility of the representative consumer, we
know it is dynamically efficient. (As we shall see, application of our
criterion from Section I leads to the same conclusion.) An infinite horizon
example is used to highlight the fact that the importance of capital risk in
no way depends on the finiteness of individual lifetimes.
Consumers are assumed to maximize the infinite horizon utility function:
(3.1)
Et 01'u(ct+i)
The economy's only productive asset is a "fruit tree" whose output
evolves as a geometric random walk with positive drift. It is not possible to
produce or cut down the fruit tree. The output of the fruit tree, all of
which is consumed in each period, thus evolves as:
(3.2)
where g > 0 and is i.i.d. with zero mean, and >
-(1+g). Note that in
this example capital income, D, is always positive and thus always exceeds
the economy's zero level of investment, so our criterion for dynamic
efficiency is satisfied.
Assets in this economy are easily priced by making use of the consumer's
first-order condition:
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(3.3) Et(Rt+iU'(Ct+i)/U'(Ct)) = 1
where is the gross return on any asset.
Now suppose the utility function is logarithmic, U(C) = ln(C), and recall
that C so that (3.3) can be written as
(3.4) = 1.
Equation (3.4) can be used to price any asset. In particular, the gross rate
of return on a riskiess asset, is constant and given by
(3.5) =
E [ )t
If the variance of v is sufficiently large, it is clear can be less
than one, so that the net interest rate can be negative despite the upward
drift in output.4 Since the safe short-term rate is constant, safe interest
rates over any horizon are also negative as long as output is sufficiently
volatile.
Equation (3.4) can also be used to determine V, the value of the stock
of fruit trees. Since the rate of return on a fruit tree is (Vt+i +
equation (3.4) verifies
(3.6) Vt = (.L.)D
Despite the uncertainty in this model economy, the dividend-price ratio is
constant. It is straightforward to show that the mean return on the fruit tree
is (1+g)/, regardless of the amount of uncertainty. Hence, increases in
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uncertainty raise the risk premium solely by lowering the risk-free rate.
This example makes clear that because of asset-price risk, permanently
productive assets can exist in equilibrium with a negative real rate of
interest, and that such a situation can easily be efficient. A lo safe
interest rate, even a negative rate in perpetuity, need not imply that the
economy is overcapitalized.
The example suggests the limited validity of arguments based on
comparisons of the safe rate of return and the average growth rate of output.
For simplicity, suppose the safe rate is negative and the mean growth rate is
positive. It has been argued that a pay—as-you-go social security scheme that
transferred one dollar from young to old in each period would be Pareto
improving, and so it would. But as long as output can conceivably fall in
each period, the feasibility of such a scheme is not guaranteed. The fact
that output has an arbitrarily high probability of rising as the horizon is
lengthened is not sufficient to assure feasibility. Internally, the argument
here parallels the well-known fallacy regarding the appropriateness of
investing only in high-yielding assets over long horizons, discussed
monosyllabically by Samuelson (1979). In both cases, "almost surely" is not
certain enough.
Our "fruit tree" example shows that a low safe rate of interest need not
imply dynamic inefficiency. Yet the results of Mehra and Prescott (1985)
suggest that additional considerations, such as market imperfections, may be
necessary to explain the observed low safe rate. The interaction between
these imperfections and dynamic efficiency may be important. For example,
some individuals may be liquidity constrained, so that the relevant interest
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rate for evaluating a hypothetical Social Security scheme exceeds the safe
rate of interest. Considering dynamic efficiency in "distorted" economies is
a worthwhile subject for future research.
IV. Conclusion
In the literature on optimal accumulation and dynamic efficiency,
substantial intellectual capital has been put into place since the early
1960s. Yet despite this investment and the growing policy concern over
capital formation, no clear answer has emerged as to whether actual economies
are dynamically efficient. To address the issue of dynamic efficiency in
practice, it is imperative to recognize the impact of uncertainty on
production, investment, and growth. The goal of this paper has therefore been
to extend dynamic efficiency results to an uncertain world.
Our central finding is simply expressed. If the capital sector is
regularly contributing to the level of consumption, then the economy is
dynamically efficient. If it is a continual drain, then the economy is
inefficient. In the United States, profit has exceeded investment in every
year since 1929. This finding leads us to conclude that the United States
economy is dynamically efficient.
Established tradition suggests that dynamic efficiency is to be evaluated
by comparing growth rates and rates of return on assets. In an uncertain
world, there is no Obvious metric for economic growth; nor is there a single
rate of return. The appropriate indicator of dynamic efficiency is the rate
of growth of the value of the capital stock, as measured in consumption goods.
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If the rate of return on any asset dominates this rate, the economy is
dynamically efficient. If the return on any asset is dominated by this rate,
the economy is dynamically inefficient. While this rate-of-return criterion
is theoretically valid, we believe it is less useful in practice than the
cash flow criterion for assessing dynamic efficiency.
We started this analysis with the troubling observation that real
interest rates are startlingly low. We reassured ourselves by demonstrating
that low, or even negative, safe rates, even in perpetuity, need not indicate
dynamic inefficiency. Our fruit-tree example suggests that asset price risk
could in principle explain the low safe rate, but we have made no attempt to
measure this risk.5
Our conclusion that the United States economy is dynamically efficient
has several important corollaries. First, Tirole (1985) shows that rational
speculative bubbles are ruled out in dynamically efficient economies.6 We
suspect, but have not proven, that Tirole's result generalizes to economies
with uncertainty. Our results thus call into doubt the existence of rational
bubbles of the sort Tirole examines.7
Second, Weil (1986) shows that an interior bequest motive, of the sort on
which Barro (1974) relies, can be ruled out in dynamically inefficient
economies. Again, we suspect that this result generalizes to uncertain
settings. Our finding of dynamic efficiency, however, suggests that such a
bequest motive cannot be ruled out. In contrast to the conclusion of
Feldstein (1976), the low safe rate of interest may not preclude Ricardian
equivalence.
While it is comforting that our cash flow criterion leads unambiguously
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to the conclusion that our economy is dynamically efficient, several questions
remain open for future research. The most important direction for future
research is the evaluation of alternative dynamic paths using stronger
criteria than the dynamic efficiency criterion. Our criterion is the dynamic
analogue of the standard Pareto criterion. The dynamic efficiency test is
therefore relatively weak -- passing it does not imply that a path is
desirable for any very attractive social welfare function. Results
characterizing the social welfare functions necessary to justify particular
paths would aid in evaluating and ranking them.
The importance of going beyond the Pareto criterion is greater in the
context of dynamic efficiency than in the normal static context. As we have
already noted, a path cannot be judged as dynamically inefficient prior to
eternity, because there is always the possibility that "excess" capital will
be consumed later. Using social welfare functions would permit, at least
sometimes, judgments that regardless of what happened in the indefinite
future, certain policies maintained over finite intervals would be
undesirable. Putting the point differently, the use of social welfare
functions would make possible the evaluation of alternative social decision
rules for determining the level of investment.
Risk-sharing considerations, which we have systematically excluded from
our analysis, provide yet another reason for introducing a social welfare
function. Programs such as social security have the ability to spread risks
across generations. We dodged the possibility of ex ante risk-spreading
bargains by treating individuals born at the same time under different
realizations of the world as being on different, separately evaluated paths.
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But given that social security or tax and expenditure policy can promote
ex ante risk spreading, such risk spreading could be considered in studies
that follow.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Efficiency):
The social planner maximizes social welfare (1.12) subject to the set of
constrai nts
(A.1) Ntc + NtIC + It F(I1,I2i...I;N;e
for all The Lagrangian for the social planner is
.(A.2) L = v(c) +
ot+1
— t +
+
— F(ItitIt2i...It;NtOt))
where p(e+1 denotes the probability of given that occurs. The
variable 0 is a vector indexing the state of nature in t+1 including history up
to t+1.
The first-order conditions are
(A.3) v'(c) =
(A.4) i(O)u'[c(Ot)] At)Nt(0t)i
(A.5) g4et1)p(eI 8t_i)v'((et)] = A(Ot)Nti(eti), for
(A.6)
j1 t+j ,oA(9t+j)4j
=
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The expression t+j I denotes those states of nature in t+j that can follow
from The transversality condition requires
(A.?) urn A(Q) V(O) = 0
t-x
where
(A.5) x(o)v(o) = •t 3— t+j+1
If the initial equilibrium satisfies these conditions for some set of positive
weights and multipliers A(E), the equilibrium is efficient.
Equation (A.3) defines the initial Lagrangian multiplier A0. Equations
(A.4) and (A.5) then uniquely define all multipliers A(Ot) and social planning
weights given the initial equilibrium. Thus, to show that the
equilibrium solves a planning problem, we need only show that (A.6) and (A.7)
are satisfied.
The first-order condition (A.6) follows from the capital market
equilibrium condition (1.4). To see this, let q÷. be the price (relative to
consumption) at the end of period t+j of a unit of investment installed in
period t. Observe q = 1 and q = 0. Let be the rate of return
between period t+j and period t+j+1 on a unit of capital installed in
period t. Therefore,
'A 9) R3 (6 ) — (F3 (0 ) + (6 )]/rr (6t+j+1 t+j+1 t+j+1 t+j+1 9t+j+1 t+j+1 '1t+j t+j
Using (A.9), the capital market equilibrium condition (1.4) implies
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(A.1O) = + x
t+j+1
Now observe from (A.4) and (A.5) that
(A.11) P(et++iI
=
for
0t4j+1 Substituting (A.11) into (A.1O) yields
(A.12) q.(e.) = [F:+1(O+.+1) +
t+j+1 t+j
Now recall that q = 1 and solve (A.12) recursively forward to obtain
(A.13) =
t+j+1 t
which is equivalent to (A.6).
To establish efficiency, we still need to show that the transversality
condition (P.7) is satisfied. From equation (P.8), we know that
(A.14) x(e)v(e) = x(e+1)F+1I+1.
t t+11_1 j— i—1 t+j+1
(Some arguments specifying the state of nature are omitted where there is no
ambiguity.) The first term on the right-hand side of this inequality equals
The second term can be rewritten with j running from zero and i
et+1
running from two:
(P.15) x(o)v(o) = +
.O i-2 e Ot+.+2)+2 1t+2-i.
t t+1
—
t+j+2
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The second term can now be written using (A.8) as the sum of A(9t+i)V(t+i) and
a remainder, producing
(A,16) j x(o)v(e) = X(O )n + A(e )V(Ot+1t+1 t+1 t+1
ot+1 et+1
U'
- It+j+2 t+j+2 t+1.j=O6
t+j+2
The third term of (A.16) can be rewritten as
U')F1 F(A.17) X(Q2 t+J+2't+l = 0t+j+1 t+j+1 t4-l
j=O 8t+j+2 j=l e++1
by beginning the index at j at one rather than zero. This expression is now
identically
U'
(A.i8) A(O.J. t+j+21t+1 = A(Ot+j4-1 t+j+l t+1.j=O 0t+j+2 8t+1 0t+j+l 9t+1
Equation (4.6) now implies
U) )F1(4.19) A(.2 t+j+2't+l =j=O e++2
Therefore, returning to (4.16),
(4.20) A(0t)V(et) = A(6 )ir + X(91)V(e1)t+1 t+1
et+1 et+1
Noting that Dt+1 = - we obtain
(4.21) Zx(e)V(et) = (1+D+1/V+1)A(Bt+1)V(et+i).
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By hypothesis, Dt+i/Vt+i 0, which implies
(A.22) ZAEtV(et) ? (1+c) A(Ot+i)V(8t+i)
t+1
Recursive substitution shows
(A..23) IX(G)V(e) (l+c)tA0V0.
Since c > 0, (A.23) implies the tranversality condition is satisfied.
In this case, the equilibrium can be represented as the optimum of the
social planning problem defined above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The capital market equilibrium condition (1.4) implies that
(A.24) R(Ot+i)p(Ot+ijUt)vt(c+i(Ot+i))/ut(c(Ut)) = I
Setting j equal to zero in (A.11) and substituting into (A.24) yields
(A.25) A(et) =
et+1I et
from which it follows
(A.26) A(Ot)V(et) =
t+1 t
Recalling that G(et+i) E V(O+1)/V(9t), equation (A.26) implies
(A.27) A(et)V(Ot) = Z
t+1 t
Now sum both sides of (A.27) over to obtain
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(A.28) t x(e)V(e) =
9E
t t+1
Therefore, if R(6t+j)/G(Ot+i) 1 + c > 1, then (A.22) and (A.23) hold, which
verifies the transversality condition. In this case, the equilibrium can be
represented as the optimum of the social planning problem defined above.
If R(e+1)/G(e+1) I — c < 1, then
(A.29) E x(et)V(et) (1-.c)Z
t t+1
Recursive substitution yie1ds
(A.30) E A(e)V/(9) (1c)
(A.30) implies the transversality condition cannot be satisfied. Hence, the
equilibrium cannot maximize any social welfare function of the form in
equation (1.12).
Note that the social welfare function in (1.12) is linear in c2(o). This
proof can be applied to a general social welfare function that is non-linear
in cz(e.t). In this case, i(Gt) can be interpreted as the derivative of social
welfare with respect to evaluated at the equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
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Footnotes
1. If new firms are regularly being started with new equity issues, the
aggregate dividend as we define it may always be negative, even when existing
firms always pay positive dividends.
2. That it is easier to measure cash flow than economic income has been a
major theme in discussions of the consumption tax, such as those presented in
Pechman (1983).
3. As noted above, rental income includes imputed rent on owner-occupied
housing. The imputed rent estimates in the National Income Accounts upon
which we rely indicate that the gross rental rate on owner-occupied housing is
considerably lower than the rate on other kinds of capital. Thus, excluding
owner-occupied housing would reinforce our conclusion.
4. Suppose that 1+g+v is lognormally distributed with mean 1+g. In this
case, ln(i+g+v1) - N(gi,a ) an
(Fl) E(l+g4v1) = exp(ji +
(F2) E[(1+g+v41)] = exp(—M +
It follows from (Fl) and (F2) that
(F3) E[(1+g+vt+i)') = exp(a2)/E(1+g+v+1).
Recalling that E(1+g+v1) = 1+g and substituting (F3) into (3.5) yields
F 2
(F4) Rt+i = [(1+g)/]exp(—a
For sufficiently large a2, RF will be less than one.
5. The results of Mehra and Prescott (1985) suggest that observed
consumption variability cannot itself explain the spread between the return on
capital and the safe rate of interest. Our point is that a low safe rate is
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not, in itself, inconsistent 'dth dynamic efficiency.
6. Tirole shows that bubbles can drive an economy to the Golden Rule. Our
finding of a strictly positive dividend indicates that the capital stock is
strictly below the Golden Rule, in which case bubbles cannot exist.
7. Of course, our results do not speak to the possibility of irrational
bubbles, or fads, such as those discussed by Shiller (1984) and Summers
(1986).
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Table 1
Investment: The United
(Percent)
States EconomyGross Profit and
Gross Profit
Year GNP
Gross Investment D
GNP
D
VGNP
1929 32.6 16.1 16.5 ——
1930 31.7 11.6 20.1 ——
1931 28.6 7.7 20.9 -—
1932 26.4 1.9 24.5 ——
1933 24.6 2.9 21.8 —-
1934 26.1 5.3 20.8 ——
1935 27.1 9.1 18.0 ——
1936 26.4 10.5 15.9 -—
1937 26.9 13.3 13.6 --
1938 26.5 7.8 18.6 ——
1939 26.7 10.4 16.3 -—
1940 28.2 13.3 14.9 —-
1941 29.4 14.6 14.8 -—
1942 29.0 6.5 22.6 ——
1943 27.2 3.2 24.0 -—
1944 25.2 3.6 21.5 ——
1945 23.2 5.3 17.9 --
1946 24.0 14.8 9.2 ——
1947 25.6 14.9 10.8 -—
1948 27.8 18.0 9.8 —-
1949 27.3 14.0 13.3 --
1950 28.4 19.1 9.3 ——
1951 28.0 18.1 9.9 ——
1952 26.9 15.2 11.? 3.9
1953 26.4 14.8 11.6 4.0
1954 26.9 14.5 12.4 4.1
1955 28.2 17.2 11.0 3.7
1956 27.6 17.0 10.6 3.4
1957 27.4 15.8 11.6 3.8
1958 27.0 13.9 13.1 4.1
1959 27.8 16.2 11.6 3.8
1960 27.1 15.2 11.9 3.9
1961 27.1 14.4 12.7 4.2
1962 27.4 15.2 12.1 4.1
1963 27.6 15.3 12.3 4.2
1964 27.7 15.3 12.4 4.3
1965 28.2 16.5 11.8 4.2
1966 27.8 16.7 11.1 4.0
1967 27.2 15.4 11.8 4.2
1968 26.6 15.3 11.3 4.0
1969 25.7 15.9 9.8 3.5
Table 1, Continued
Year
Gross Profit
GNP
Gross Investment 0
GNP
0
VGNP
1970 24.6 14.7 9.9 3.5
1971 25.2 15.6 9.6 3.4
1972 25.6 16.7 8.9 3.1
1973 25.6 17.6 8.1 2.8
1974 25.1 16.3 8.8 2.8
1975 26.2 13.7 12.4 3.9
1976 26.4 15.6 10.8 3.4
1977 27.1 17.3 9.9 3.1
1978 27.6 18.5 9.1 2.7
1979 27.6 18.1 9.5 2.8
1980 27.4 160 11.4 3.2
1981 28.1 16.9 11.2 3.2
1982 27.7 14.1 13.6 3.9
1983 28.4 14.7 13.7 4.0
1984 28.5 17.6 10.9 3.3
1985 28.0 16.5 11.5 3.6
Source: NIPA. Capital Cash Flow is calculated as national income plus
capital consumption allowances less wages and salaries and
67 percent of proprietors' income which is imputed to labor.
This imputation is discussed in Christianson (1971).
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Table 2
Gross Profit and Investment:
The U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Sector
(Percent)
NA
29. 1
28.7
25.1
21.0
19.4
20.6
18.2
16.7
16.9
15.5
18.0
17.1
17.5
17.4
18.4
16.1
14.6
15.5
16.9
16.7
17.7
23.9
31.5
29.7
30.0
34.3
35.7
31.7
26.6
25.3
23.5
23.4
22.1
NA
14.7
13.3
13.3
12.3
10.8
9.6
9.8
9.2
8.9
8.9
9.8
9.5
10.5
11.7
11.6
9.7
9.5
9.9
10.4
10.2
11.4
15.6
15.4
17.4
17.6
21.4
21.9
18.9
16.9
15.1
14. 1
17.3
15.9
NA
13.6
14.3
10.2
7.0
7.5
10.0
7.6
6.3
7.5
6.9
8.0
7.3
6.9
5.9
6.9
6.2
5.7
5.6
6.8
6.5
5.7
5.5
14.4
10.3
9.6
9.9
12.4
10.2
7.1
7.9
9.3
6.7
8.5
Gross Profit
Year V
Gross Investment D
VV
Table 3
Dynamic Efficiency in Different Countries
Source: OECD. These data are in some cases not adjusted for the labor
income of proprietors. As discussed by Sachs (1979), this
approximation is quite innocuous. For the United State, the
adjustment is equal to about 4 percent of GNP.
Difference of Gross Profit and Investment as a Percentage of GNP
Year England France Germany Italy Canada Japan
1960 11.8 18.2 12.4 22.1 12.7 17.6
1961 10.6 17.4 10.9 21.0 14.0 9.5
1962 11.5 16.2 10.0 19.9 14.0 14.6
1963 12.1 15.3 10.7 17.8 14.4 13.7
1964 8.8 12.9 9.2 19.1 12.8 12.4
1965 9.4 13.6 8.5 22.9 9.4 15.2
1966 8.7 12.9 9.9 24.1 8.3 15.4
1967 8.3 13.5 13.7 22.5 9.4 14.2
1968 7.7 13.6 13.5 23.1 10.7 12.9
1969 8.3 11.9 10.3 22.1 9.4 12.1
1970 7.5 11.8 7.8 18.9 10.5 11.6
1971 8.9 12.3 7.5 19.1 8.9 11.2
1972 10.4 12.0 2.7 19.9 9.2 11.4
1973 7.8 10.9 7.9 15.4 9.4 8.1
1974 4.4 8.7 10.0 12.2 8.2 5.2
1975 6.0 10.9 12.4 16.6 9.0 6.8
1976 5.5 8.9 11.5 13.5 7.5 7.8
1977 9.1 9.9 11.9 14.6 7.9 7.8
1978 9.6 11.0 12.1 16.4 10.5 8.9
1979 8.4 10.0 9.8 16.7 10.5 7.2
1980 10.1 8.3 8.4 12.9 12.4 7.5
191 11.9 10.4 10.8 15.1 9.3 7.3
1982 12.9 9.8 13.1 16.5 12.9 8.1
1983 13.2 11.7 13.6 17.1 15.3 9.4
1984 13.9 12.9 13.8 17.3 17.3 9.4
